#Debian and #FDroid require signature verification, and #FDroid is built on top of #Android's APK signing. This improves things a lot but does not mean they are immune. Debian and F-Droid repos can still override packages lower priority repos. It could make sense to have a "no overrides allowed" setting, but that would restrict useful features. Maybe F-Droid could implement "no new signing keys when overriding" rule by default, I wonder how much that would break what people are doing now? 2/2
I'm sad to say that my new #laptop still needs non-free firmware blobs for working WiFi, Bluetooth, audio, and power management. Now #Debian will include those in the installer. Are we losing this #FreeSoftware fight? At least the graphics driver is #free and included in upstream Linux, that is progress. I specifically avoided #nvidia for that purpose.
How are others feeling on the firmware blob fight?
@ljacomet I just saw your slides for your talk "Protecting your organization
against attacks via the
build system", a great overview! I'm a #Debian dev who has worked on packaging #Gradle. We'd love to make it as close to your version as possible. There is a proprietary build dependency that blocks that from happening. https://github.com/gradle/gradle/issues/16439
The #Debian #Android Tools Team now has a blog, including news about packaging #Gradle #Kotlin sdkmanager and related #FreeSoftware issues https://android-tools-team.pages.debian.net/blog/
Hosting code with automated publishing into well known namespaces is looking more and more like a broken model. A better approach is human verification of package names like in #Debian, @fdroidorg, #MavenCentral. Then other pieces can be safely automated https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/critical-cloudflare-cdn-flaw-allowed-compromise-of-12-percent-of-all-sites/
I'd love to see data on what verified boot actually stops. The ideal malware implants itself at the lowest level possible. Is there good public data on these kinds of exploits on #Android #Debian #Windows #iOS etc? Does standard spyware do that? Writing to /system requires a root exploit, lots of malware never gets root. How often there are vulns in #VerifiedBoot itself. Here's a real world full #exploit of verified boot:
https://threatpost.com/multiple-vulnerabilities-found-in-nvidia-qualcomm-huawei-bootloaders/127833/
#Debian created an ecosystem where the software available there is reviewed and trusted, so the system can prioritize flexibility over security. In #Google Play, there are many apps we feel forced to use, despite knowing they are unethical or are tracking us. Google responds by locking down #Android to reduce data leaks, which also reduces the system's flexibility. #FreeSoftware puts the user in control so we can build user-friendly systems without being forced into bad decisions.
If anyone is looking for a #ReproducibleBuilds #Java / #Android project to hack around with, jtorctl now builds with #Gradle (from gradle.org or #Debian), #Maven, and #Bazel with sketches of Ant. The idea is that if all the build tools make the same JAR, no need to trust the build tool.
https://GitLab.com/eighthave/jtorctl or https://GitHub.com/eighthave/jtorctl
Key parts of the #Debian #AndroidDev tools package suite no longer build on anything but x86. This is also true with the new 10.0.0 version. I'd love to see the #ARM and #MIPS packages make it into #bullseye. We need contributors! If you can help, see: