Hosting code with automated publishing into well known namespaces is looking more and more like a broken model. A better approach is human verification of package names like in , @fdroidorg, . Then other pieces can be safely automated bleepingcomputer.com/news/secu

I'd love to see data on what verified boot actually stops. The ideal malware implants itself at the lowest level possible. Is there good public data on these kinds of exploits on etc? Does standard spyware do that? Writing to /system requires a root exploit, lots of malware never gets root. How often there are vulns in itself. Here's a real world full of verified boot:
threatpost.com/multiple-vulner

created an ecosystem where the software available there is reviewed and trusted, so the system can prioritize flexibility over security. In Play, there are many apps we feel forced to use, despite knowing they are unethical or are tracking us. Google responds by locking down to reduce data leaks, which also reduces the system's flexibility. puts the user in control so we can build user-friendly systems without being forced into bad decisions.

If anyone is looking for a / project to hack around with, jtorctl now builds with (from gradle.org or ), , and with sketches of Ant. The idea is that if all the build tools make the same JAR, no need to trust the build tool.

GitLab.com/eighthave/jtorctl or GitHub.com/eighthave/jtorctl

Key parts of the tools package suite no longer build on anything but x86. This is also true with the new 10.0.0 version. I'd love to see the and packages make it into . We need contributors! If you can help, see:

bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugrep

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