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Oh, and lastly, this whole Mastodon thread as a much more convenient blog post 馃槣:

netmeister.org/blog/https-rrs.

#dns #svcb #https #rfc9460 鉁岋笍

I just started a thread on Hacker News about Encrypted Client Hello (ECH):
news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3

Feel free to comment either here or there.

#ECH #DoH #Firefox #Mozilla #Chrome #Chromium

I hacked some ECH (encrypted client hello) support in the JDK network stack the other day (in TLS 1.3).
github.com/johanvos/jdk/tree/e

#java #ECH #openjdk

Hey, so #RFC9460 HTTPS/SVCB records are neat, right?

They...
- speed up your time-to-first-packet (by basically stuffing the Alt-Svc HTTP header / ALPN TLS extension into the #DNS);
- let you do redirection on the zone apex without using CNAMEs;
- allow for simple DNS load distribution and failover;
- obviate HSTS and the cumbersone preloading process;
- enable stronger privacy protections via Encrypted Client Hello aka #ECH

can now present some of the details of in streams, as of v4.2.0. For example, it can dissect the config data that comes from DNS. gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark

We have started the second round of our partnership defo.ie to ensure that the new standard called () works for public interest use cases. We also are working to reduce the pressure towards inherent to the improvements of hiding the domain name. You can find more details in our project announcement: guardianproject.info/2023/11/0

Tired of Clicking On "I Agree" To Use Your Smartphone?

No Requirement To Click Away Your Privacy And Security To Use Smartphones, Tablet PCs, Servers, And Laptop PCs Supported By PureOS From Purism.

Purism Puts You In Control Of Your Privacy And Security Instead Of Giving Control Over To Google, Apple, Microsoft, Or Any Other Tech Giant Who Employs Predatory Surveillance Business Practices.

puri.sm/posts/terms-of-use/

We just created a for how to set up dev/test servers using our enabled forks of and running on . It should be very quick to get started using a new domain: guardianproject.info/2023/11/1

We are looking for feedback about how to help interested devs start messing around with . What are your blockers and interests?

The first fully merged, audited and shipped bit of code from our defo.ie project is Hybrid Public Key Encryption ( RFC9180), it has been shipped by openssl.org/blog/blog/2023/10/ It is a building block for and , providing standard methods for using public key cryptography to encrypt arbitrary blocks of data.

For anyone who is interested in implementing Encrypted ClientHello (), we have set up a new public room: matrix.to/#/#ech-dev:matrix.or or irc://irc.oftc.net/ech-dev

Willkommen bei #ORFodon!

Der @ORF_News Bot hat jetzt seine eigene Instanz und eine Menge neuer Funktionen. Die Sparten und Bundesl盲ndernachrichten haben jetzt ihre eigenen Konten und dementsprechend ist eine viel flexiblere Filterung der Nachrichten und Beitr盲ge des #ORF m枚glich.

Um Mehrfachbeitr盲ge zu vermeiden, boosten die Kan盲le einander.

Der Dienst wird weiterhin inoffiziell und privat betrieben.

Viel Spa脽!

Weitere Informationen:
orfodon.org/about

#Mastodon #Fediverse #News

austrian public broadcaster is on the fediverse, in case you are into monitoring int'l news: orfodon.org/@ORFodon/111375092

Apparently 's MAC privacy protection never really worked as released in 2020, they apparently just fixed it in 17.1 after years of touting this privacy protection.
arstechnica.com/security/2023/

For example, the biggest incident that I know about remains en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XcodeGho, which got into over 4000 apps, which all passed 's review and were shipped by the Apple App Store. All told, those apps were installed 128 million times. Another measure is which seems to have maintained zero click access to and for years. That is spread by exploiting messenger apps, not by or "sideloading" 3/

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Google and Apple provide data about the malware they catch in their app store review processes. Both of them talk about "sideloading" as a security risk. Notably, neither Apple nor Google provide data on how much malware comes from outside of their app stores. Nor do they provide data-based analysis of which is the bigger threat: malware that makes it into their app stores or from other channels. They have this data, they track installs and active apps plus there is etc 2/

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In my work with I've discussed our work with gov regulators for South Africa, UK, EU and Japan as well as competition litigators from multiple US States and the EU. From this, I'm starting to see a picture of 's and 's semi-related strategies of making "sideloading" (installing apps outside of their control) look bad as a way to keep their monopolies in the face of and other regulatory actions. I'm still looking for data about the actual real world risks 1/

Perhaps the most difficult case ever for packagers: They do all the things that make packaging a nightmare:

* Build the tool with itself
* Circular dependencies: Gradle needs to build which needs Gradle to build...
* Depend on snapshots to build releases, but then they don't keep a way to reproduce the snapshot releases github.com/gradle/gradle/issue
* Java-style bundling of all dependencies
* Hidden proprietary depends github.com/gradle/gradle/issue

thanks ebourg for keeping on!

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