Guardian Project @guardianproject@librem.one

EFF's latest report shows that many of the internet's ills have one thing in common: they're based on the business model of widespread corporate surveillance online. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/11/address-online-harms-we-must-first-do-privacy

Oh, and lastly, this whole Mastodon thread as a much more convenient blog post 😜:

https://www.netmeister.org/blog/https-rrs.html

#dns #svcb #https #rfc9460 ✌️

I just started a thread on Hacker News about Encrypted Client Hello (ECH):
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38066009

Feel free to comment either here or there.

#ECH #DoH #Firefox #Mozilla #Chrome #Chromium

I hacked some ECH (encrypted client hello) support in the JDK network stack the other day (in TLS 1.3).
https://github.com/johanvos/jdk/tree/ech2

#java #ECH #openjdk

Hey, so #RFC9460 HTTPS/SVCB records are neat, right?

They...
- speed up your time-to-first-packet (by basically stuffing the Alt-Svc HTTP header / ALPN TLS extension into the #DNS);
- let you do redirection on the zone apex without using CNAMEs;
- allow for simple DNS load distribution and failover;
- obviate HSTS and the cumbersone preloading process;
- enable stronger privacy protections via Encrypted Client Hello aka #ECH

Mozilla is ringing the alarm bell on a dangerous EU regulation.

https://last-chance-for-eidas.org

Willkommen bei #ORFodon!

Der @ORF_News Bot hat jetzt seine eigene Instanz und eine Menge neuer Funktionen. Die Sparten und Bundesländernachrichten haben jetzt ihre eigenen Konten und dementsprechend ist eine viel flexiblere Filterung der Nachrichten und Beiträge des #ORF möglich.

Um Mehrfachbeiträge zu vermeiden, boosten die Kanäle einander.

Der Dienst wird weiterhin inoffiziell und privat betrieben.

Viel Spaß!

Weitere Informationen:
https://orfodon.org/about

#Mastodon #Fediverse #News

austrian public broadcaster is on the fediverse, in case you are into monitoring int'l news: https://orfodon.org/@ORFodon/111375092254666650

For example, the biggest #mobile #malware incident that I know about remains #XCodeGhost https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XcodeGhost, which got into over 4000 apps, which all passed #Apple's review and were shipped by the Apple App Store. All told, those apps were installed 128 million times. Another measure is #NSOGroup #Pegasus which seems to have maintained zero click access to #Android and #iOS for years. That is spread by exploiting messenger apps, not by #AppStore or "sideloading" 3/

Google and Apple provide data about the malware they catch in their app store review processes. Both of them talk about "sideloading" as a security risk. Notably, neither Apple nor Google provide data on how much malware comes from outside of their app stores. Nor do they provide data-based analysis of which is the bigger threat: malware that makes it into their app stores or from other channels. They have this data, they track installs and active apps plus there is #PlayProtect #XProtect etc 2/

In my work with #FDroid I've discussed our work with gov regulators for South Africa, UK, EU and Japan as well as competition litigators from multiple US States and the EU. From this, I'm starting to see a picture of #Apple's and #Google's semi-related strategies of making "sideloading" (installing apps outside of their #gatekeeper control) look bad as a way to keep their monopolies in the face of #DMA and other regulatory actions. I'm still looking for data about the actual real world risks 1/

Perhaps the most difficult case ever for #Debian packagers: #Gradle They do all the things that make packaging a nightmare:

* Build the tool with itself
* Circular dependencies: Gradle needs #Kotlin to build which needs Gradle to build...
* Depend on snapshots to build releases, but then they don't keep a way to reproduce the snapshot releases https://github.com/gradle/gradle/issues/26516
* Java-style bundling of all dependencies
* Hidden proprietary depends https://github.com/gradle/gradle/issues/16439

thanks ebourg for keeping on!