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@amaditalks @jeffalyanak It is true that a badly designed version of that plan would be exclusionary. There are existing, well designed versions of that plan that improve accessibility for all. In Vienna, subways, trams, buses and many trains are wheelchair accessible. They are clean, fast, frequent and cost 1€/day with a year pass. They take you everywhere in the city, including the car-free zones. Car-based solutions will always disadvantage children, the blind, and many other people.

@wonderfall Sorry, I was under the impression that you were OK with discussing your public posts and their contents in public. I'm happy to talk with you about it, in public or private. You never reached out to me, so I figured you did not want to talk to me about it. People ask on F-Droid forums about your post. Since it is about F-Droid, we are not just going to ignore them. That would be a disservice to our users. I don't need to bring it up again, I'm happy to let bygones be bygones

Really cool write up about a vulnerability in Google home devices that could have been exploited via war driving or targeted attacks downrightnifty.me/blog/2022/12 #research #BugBounty #google

I DON'T WANT SELF DRIVING CARS!!!!

✔️ I want boring things like public transit that comes so regularly I don't need to check a schedule.

✔️ I want fast passenger rail so accessible and easy it's preferable to suffering airports.

✔️ I want cities that aren't built around cars-as-default

✔️ I want the country to own it.

I recently wrote a post detailing the recent #LastPass breach from a #password cracker's perspective, and for the most part it was well-received and widely boosted. However, a good number of people questioned why I recommend ditching LastPass and expressed concern with me recommending people jump ship simply because they suffered a breach. Even more are questioning why I recommend #Bitwarden and #1Password, what advantages they hold over LastPass, and why would I dare recommend yet another cloud-based password manager (because obviously the problem is the entire #cloud, not a particular company.)

So, here are my responses to all of these concerns!

Let me start by saying I used to support LastPass. I recommended it for years and defended it publicly in the media. If you search Google for "jeremi gosney" + "lastpass" you'll find hundreds of articles where I've defended and/or pimped LastPass (including in Consumer Reports magazine). I defended it even in the face of vulnerabilities and breaches, because it had superior UX and still seemed like the best option for the masses despite its glaring flaws. And it still has a somewhat special place in my heart, being the password manager that actually turned me on to password managers. It set the bar for what I required from a password manager, and for a while it was unrivaled.

But things change, and in recent years I found myself unable to defend LastPass. I can't recall if there was a particular straw that broke the camel's back, but I do know that I stopped recommending it in 2017 and fully migrated away from it in 2019. Below is an unordered list of the reasons why I lost all faith in LastPass:

- LastPass's claim of "zero knowledge" is a bald-faced lie. They have about as much knowledge as a password manager can possibly get away with. Every time you login to a site, an event is generated and sent to LastPass for the sole purpose of tracking what sites you are logging into. You can disable telemetry, except disabling it doesn't do anything - it still phones home to LastPass every time you authenticate somewhere. Moreover, nearly everything in your LastPass vault is unencrypted. I think most people envision their vault as a sort of encrypted database where the entire file is protected, but no -- with LastPass, your vault is a plaintext file and only a few select fields are encrypted. The only thing that would be worse is if...

- LastPass uses shit #encryption (or "encraption", as @sc00bz calls it). Padding oracle vulnerabilities, use of ECB mode (leaks information about password length and which passwords in the vault are similar/the same. recently switched to unauthenticated CBC, which isn't much better, plus old entries will still be encrypted with ECB mode), vault key uses AES256 but key is derived from only 128 bits of entropy, encryption key leaked through webui, silent KDF downgrade, KDF hash leaked in log files, they even roll their own version of AES - they essentially commit every "crypto 101" sin. All of these are trivial to identify (and fix!) by anyone with even basic familiarity with cryptography, and it's frankly appalling that an alleged security company whose product hinges on cryptography would have such glaring errors. The only thing that would be worse is if...

- LastPass has terrible secrets management. Your vault encryption key always resident in memory and never wiped, and not only that, but the entire vault is decrypted once and stored entirely in memory. If that wasn't enough, the vault recovery key and dOTP are stored on each device in plain text and can be read without root/admin access, rendering the master password rather useless. The only thing that would be worse is if...

- LastPass's browser extensions are garbage. Just pure, unadulterated garbage. Tavis Ormandy went on a hunting spree a few years back and found just about every possible bug -- including credential theft and RCE -- present in LastPass's browser extensions. They also render your browser's sandbox mostly ineffective. Again, for an alleged security company, the sheer amount of high and critical severity bugs was beyond unconscionable. All easy to identify, all easy to fix. Their presence can only be explained by apathy and negligence. The only thing that would be worse is if...

- LastPass's API is also garbage. Server-can-attack-client vulns (server can request encryption key from the client, server can instruct client to inject any javascript it wants on every web page, including code to steal plaintext credentials), JWT issues, HTTP verb confusion, account recovery links can be easily forged, the list goes on. Most of these are possibly low-risk, except in the event that LastPass loses control of its servers. The only thing that would be worse is if...

- LastPass has suffered 7 major #security breaches (malicious actors active on the internal network) in the last 10 years. I don't know what the threshold of "number of major breaches users should tolerate before they lose all faith in the service" is, but surely it's less than 7. So all those "this is only an issue if LastPass loses control of its servers" vulns are actually pretty damn plausible. The only thing that would be worse is if...

- LastPass has a history of ignoring security researchers and vuln reports, and does not participate in the infosec community nor the password cracking community. Vuln reports go unacknowledged and unresolved for months, if not years, if not ever. For a while, they even had an incorrect contact listed for their security team. Bugcrowd fields vulns for them now, and most if not all vuln reports are handled directly by Bugcrowd and not by LastPass. If you try to report a vulnerability to LastPass support, they will pretend they do not understand and will not escalate your ticket to the security team. Now, Tavis Ormandy has praised LastPass for their rapid response to vuln reports, but I have a feeling this is simply because it's Tavis / Project Zero reporting them as this is not the experience that most researchers have had.

You see, I'm not simply recommending that users bail on LastPass because of this latest breach. I'm recommending you run as far way as possible from LastPass due to its long history of incompetence, apathy, and negligence. It's abundantly clear that they do not care about their own security, and much less about your security.

So, why do I recommend Bitwarden and 1Password? It's quite simple:

- I personally know the people who architect 1Password and I can attest that not only are they extremely competent and very talented, but they also actively engage with the password cracking community and have a deep, *deep* desire to do everything in the most correct manner possible. Do they still get some things wrong? Sure. But they strive for continuous improvement and sincerely care about security.

- Bitwarden is 100% open source. I have not done a thorough code review, but I have taken a fairly long glance at the code and I am mostly pleased with what I've seen. I'm less thrilled about it being written in a garbage collected language and there are some tradeoffs that are made there, but overall Bitwarden is a solid product. I also prefer Bitwarden's UX. I've also considered crowdfunding a formal audit of Bitwarden, much in the way the Open Crypto Audit Project raised the funds to properly audit TrueCrypt. The community would greatly benefit from this.

Is the cloud the problem? No. The vast majority of issues LastPass has had have nothing to do with the fact that it is a cloud-based solution. Further, consider the fact that the threat model for a cloud-based password management solution should *start* with the vault being compromised. In fact, if password management is done correctly, I should be able to host my vault anywhere, even openly downloadable (open S3 bucket, unauthenticated HTTPS, etc.) without concern. I wouldn't do that, of course, but the point is the vault should be just that -- a vault, not a lockbox.

I hope this clarifies things! As always, if you found this useful, please boost for reach and give me a follow for more password insights!

@Gargron is providing a shining example of the new breed of "startup" culture that is arising. We want impact in the public interest, and just to make a living doing it. Getting rich is besides the point, and it is certainly not a reason to compromise the goals of the project. I believe is another example of this.

arstechnica.com/tech-policy/20

@JewishConversations @futurebird I'd go broader than that: I don't think it makes sense to combine very public posts with private posts in the same app or platform. This is part of why I use the librem.one instance: it has direct messages disabled puri.sm/posts/introducing-libr

I am grateful to @Gargron because he is committed to preserve #Mastodon and the #Fediverse as a public network of communities, creating free knowledge for everyone, and he's keeping this commitment also against powerful market forces that would like to transform this "digital common" into a private investment generating profit for someone. GAFAM moguls should understand that the era of private social networks where people's data are used as cash cows is coming to an end.

arstechnica.com/tech-policy/20

@matthew_d_green The solution to the problem posed in that piece is referenced in it: got messages when they had a legitimate reason to have them. End-to-end encryption stops mass surveillance, but clearly did not stop the Jan 6th investigations. I think its pretty clear that phones should be treated like one's house in terms of search and seizure. Courts can compel people to give info, and can compel people to unlock their phones. My guess is that's how FBI got info from Signal.

Am Beginn ist sie breiter, die Schottengasse. Gelegenheit für 3 Parkspuren mitten im Zentrum Wiens, wo wirklich niemand überirdisch von der Allgemeinheit subventioniert parken müsste. Parken kostet für Wiener 10€ im Monat. Der Platz, im Besitz uns aller, ist das 20-fache wert.

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Night train from Brussels to Berlin via Amsterdam starting mid 2023! 22:30-06:48 is not long enough for a full restful sleep, although continuing on to Prague would be nice. europeansleeper.eu/nl/coming-s

Ich würde gerne eine (lange) Geschichte Wiens lesen. Hat jemand Tipps?

@Billie One thing is clear: if bumping breaks key features, then it is not worth doing it, especially if the app is shipped via from the f-droid.org repo.

When you do NOT publish your #android #app in the Play Store (e.g. #gadgetbridge, #fdroidapp , #imagepipe), is there a good reason to increase the #targetSdk ?

Does it matter at all?

The last sdk updates mainly impose restrictions without much benefit for developers and make development harder.

Why upgrade targetSdk when you can completely ignore G***le's rules about minimum targetSdk?

What are your thoughts?

@jz YES! I'm already a practioner! I highly recommend it

@Billie For apps that don't have features broken by , you might as well up it. If your app is in a memory safe language e.g. Java, Kotlin then the targetSdkVersion does not help you much while restricting features. If the app uses C/native code and you don't want to think too much about security vulns, then upping it could help you. My understanding is that thinks of it as a way to protect private data from unknown apps, so they don't have to review uploads to Play.

Sandboxes have often been represented as a security feature, but it seems there are always ways out, e.g. there are always jailbreaks available for iOS. Sandboxes still make sense for restricting non-malware apps from accessing private info. For security, its more important to avoid targeted exploits, e.g. reducing identifiability, to force the use 0days into broader targets, which is then more likely to burn that 0day. Users of 0day exploits are rarely willing to burn one to target one person

@rogermcnamee on top of that, each affected Facebook user has been allocated about $2.25. Yup, two dollars and change. A classic example of the problems of class action lawsuits. The firm gets to cash out with $181 million, but the actual settlement for the affected parties is not worth the time to do the paperwork.

@filippo Cloudflare will tell you about it: blog.cloudflare.com/icloud-pri It is based on the standard for proxying over UDP/QUIC.

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