It is proven! I am kisom on Keybase: https://keybase.io/kisom/sigchain#e6691e1c2b069abac7879e9091bc500e75042576d27893e0c2c84d1dbd7385e00f
I've started wroting a portable version of OpenBSD's signify(1): https://github.com/kisom/psignify
Thread:
We need to talk about packaging, signatures, checksums and reproducible builds:
On your system you have a keyring of packagers' GPG keys that you inherently trust.
Releases get signed with a key, which verifies the packager as the author, and supposedly lets you and your system trust their contents.
But do you really trust your packagers? How could you? Do you know them personally and monitor their packaging work?
Would you even know if they release a package with malicious content?
The problem is intermediates are often signed for ~3 years - just long enough for a lot of the engineers who set them up to have left or to be mostly forgotten because they just work. Three years comes faster than you think...
The core problem is people mostly only think about roots and leaves; it’s not until you get bit by this that it starts to become institutional memory.
I remember running into this at a past employer where TLS certs were core to the business. It happened on a New Year’s Day, and I spent a lot of that holiday trying to fix it.
https://hacks.mozilla.org/2019/05/technical-details-on-the-recent-firefox-add-on-outage/
I built my own S/MMS microblogging site and decided to write up a little about it: https://ai6ua.net/blog/2019/05/10/hello-nomad/
I’ve been giving riot a go and... it’s barely usable. Constant problems with undecryptable messages, the key verification process is cumbersome. There should be an option to TOFU or verify all. Signing out caused my iPad to lose all its keys and I had to approve from a different device. I don’t know how this is supposed to be an acceptable alternative from a usability standpoint to other offerings.